Design and validation of the pseudoscientific thinking scale

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21142/DES-1501-2023-0010

Keywords:

pseudoscience, pseudoscientific thinking, validity and reliability

Abstract

The objective of this research was to design and validate a pseudoscientific thinking scale. The study is of an instrumental type, whose sample consisted of 686 Peruvian adult participants (42% women). Regarding construct validity, an exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analysis were performed; and for reliability evidence, McDonald’s omega coefficient was used. The results of the EFA showed a unidimensional model of 8 items. The CFA presented an adequate fit, c2(20) = 35.5, CFI = .995, RMSEA = .047, SRMR = .026, TLI = .994 thus confirming the one-dimensional structure with factor loadings between the values of l = .68 and l = .86 (w = .92). Finally, the academic and social implications of this new psychometric instrument are discussed.

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Author Biographies

  • Freddy Jaimes Alvarez, Universidad Científica del Sur

    Licenciado por la Universidad de San Martín de Porres. Magíster en Epistemología por la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Docente en la Universidad de la Universidad Científica del Sur. 

  • Víctor García-Belaunde Velarde, Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola

    Magíster por la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos y magíster por la Universidad Nacional de Australia.

  • Fabrizio López De Pomar, Universidad de Washington

    Licenciado en la Universidad de Lima y asistente de investigación en la Universidad de Washington.

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Published

2023-01-26

How to Cite

Design and validation of the pseudoscientific thinking scale. (2023). Desde El Sur, 15(1), e0010. https://doi.org/10.21142/DES-1501-2023-0010

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